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Abstract
We investigate the ﬁnancial resources used by small businesses in Japan during
the period of recovery from a severe recession. Unlike large listed ﬁrms, small
businesses cannot easily issue commercial debt or equity. Therefore, small businesses
largely depend on trade credit and bank loans. Many previous studies argue that
bank loans are cheaper than trade credit; so many ﬁrms (particularly unconstrained
ﬁrms) use bank loans, especially in ﬁnancially developed economies. However, the
Japanese evidence does not support this view. First, small businesses with higher
credit demand increase trade credit more during the period of the recovery from a
severe recession. Second, creditworthy ﬁrms (for example, ﬁrms with more collateral
assets) also increase trade credit to ﬁnance their growth opportunities. Third, ﬁrms
in unstable industries increase trade credit more. This suggests that suppliers are
able to oﬀer credit, unlike banks, as they have a relative advantage in day-by-day
monitoring.
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1 Introduction
We investigate how small businesses ﬁnance their growth opportunities in Japan as an
example of a ﬁnancially developed economy.1 Many studies argue that small businesses in
countries with poorly developed ﬁnancial institutions cannot borrow enough from ﬁnancial
institutions, even if they have good growth opportunities and the need for external ﬁnance.
Therefore, these ﬁrms use trade credit as another source of short-term ﬁnance for small
business. For instance, Ge and Qiu (2007) show that in China, a country with a relatively
poorly developed formal ﬁnancial sector, ﬁrms support their growth through trade credit
ﬁnancing. Fisman and Love (2003) also show that higher rates of industrial growth in
countries with weaker ﬁnancial institutions are associated with greater dependence on
trade credit ﬁnancing.
The basic premise of these studies is that trade credit is the last resort for ﬁrm ﬁnanc-
ing. More particularly, while large ﬁrms can easily access capital markets, many small
businesses face diﬃculties. As a result, small businesses largely depend on indirect forms
of ﬁnance, including bank loans and trade credit.2 However, Smith (1987) and Ng et al.
(1999), among others, argue that trade credit is an inferior source of ﬁnance. According
to these studies, the ﬁnancial cost of trade credit is prohibitively expensive because the
annual interest rates exceed 40%. Therefore, after exhausting internal cash, ﬁrms with
additional needs for ﬁnancing prefer to use bank credit as a cheap funding source. For
example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) conclude that small businesses with short-lived bank
relationships use trade credit more, as banks do not oﬀer suﬃcient credit because of in-
formation asymmetry. In addition, Nilsen (2002) show that when the credit supplies of
1For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that the ratio of domestic credit and stock market
capitalization to GDP, as a traditional proxy for ﬁnancial development, is 1.31 in Japan. This is the
third-highest value in their sample of countries.
2In addition to trade credit and bank loans, small businesses face several choices for ﬁnancing inventory
investment, comprising trade credit, bank loans, the use of cash holdings, collecting trade receivables,
and discounting bill receivables.
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banks decrease with tight monetary policy, ﬁrms use more trade credit.
However, the argument that trade credit is a last resort form of ﬁnancing has some
shortcomings. Previous studies assume that trade credit contracts are only “2-10 net 30”
with annual interest rates of 40% or more.3 However, according to Miwa and Ramseyer
(2008), a wide range of other credit conditions exist, ranging from “0.5-30 net 90” (a 3%
annual interest rate) to “5-15 net 30” (a 120% annual interest rate), implying that the
cost of trade credit is not always high. Moreover, while the “2-10 net 30” contract applies
in some countries (for example, the US and the UK), it does not in Japan (Uesugi et al.
(2009)). Moreover, Marotta (2005) refute that trade credit ﬁnancing is more expensive
than bank loans using Italian data. Combined, these studies suggest that trade credit is
not always an inferior source of ﬁnancing to bank loans and not a ﬁnancing last resort.
This study investigates the ﬁnancial sources small ﬁrms with a greater need for external
ﬁnance use in Japan. In particular, we examine whether trade credit is inferior to bank
loans in Japan. We focus on the period of recovery from the “lost decade”, the biggest
recession since World War II in Japan. Following the asset price bubble of the late
1980s, the Japanese economy experienced a severe recession. The recession worsened
in the late 1990s and the GDP growth rate was negative during 1998–1999. In 2000,
the economy experienced a mild recovery, but worsened again in 2001–2002. This long
post-bubble recession is the lost decade. After 2003, Japan experienced a long boom
period, and many ﬁrms had good growth opportunities and needed external ﬁnance, so
they increased sales and inventory investment. Therefore, during the recovery from the
lost decade, small ﬁrms faced an exogenous increase in credit demand to ﬁnance working
capital and investments. Consequently, this period is suitable for investigating the sources
of funds that small ﬁrms with greater need of ﬁnance use in developed countries. If bank
3As Petersen and Rajan (1994), the annual interest rates of trade credit is 44.6%. They explain that
“the ﬁrm is borrowing at 2/98 or 2.04 percent per 20-day period. Since there are 365/20 or 18.25 such
periods in a year, this is equivalent to an annual rate of 44.6 percent ([1 + 2/98](365/20) - 1)”. (footnote
18 in page 21)
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loans are indeed superior to trade credit, ﬁrms with greater need of external ﬁnance will
then use bank loans instead of trade credit.
Our ﬁndings provide evidence that small ﬁrms with a greater need of ﬁnancing use
trade credit more during the period of recovery in Japan. First, the trend in trade payables
ﬂuctuates more compared to bank credit. The median annual growth rate of trade credit
is positive during the recovery and negative during the recession. In contrast, the median
annual growth rate of bank credit is zero during both the recession and the recovery,
suggesting that banks merely roll over their loans and do not oﬀer new credit if ﬁrms
need additional external ﬁnance. Instead, trade partners oﬀer more credit to ﬁrms with
new credit demands. The results are similar when we limit the sample to ﬁrms with
increases in sales or inventories. Second, the main reason for using trade credit is not the
lack of the availability of bank loans. Firms with more collateral and lower leverage are
less risky ﬁrms, and they can more easily use bank credit. This implies that they use trade
credit less when bank credit is superior. However, they use trade credit if they need to
increase inventory and have growth opportunities available. Previous studies imply that
traditional ﬁnancial institutions, such as banks, ﬁnance ﬁrms with high-return projects
in ﬁnancially developed countries. Our data do not support this view and we show that
even in developed countries, ﬁrms use more trade credit than bank loans.
Third, especially in unstable industries during the lost decade, ﬁrms with greater need
of ﬁnance increase trade credit more. In these industries, creditors required up-to-date
information about borrower risk and this called for day-by-day monitoring as business
conditions changed rapidly. This implies that ﬁrms increase trade credit because trade
partners can mitigate the problems of asymmetric information. This observation supports
the advantages of information acquisition by trade partners (Petersen and Rajan (1997)).
We also suggest that ﬁrms can use trade credit more easily than bank credit if they
require quick credit (Miwa and Ramseyer (2008)). In general, borrowers in unstable
industries face diﬃculty planning their future credit demand because business conditions
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are changing rapidly. Therefore, trade partners can oﬀer quicker credit as they merely
delay billing these customers.
Our study related to various previous studies. Many studies focus on the empirical
investigation of the informational advantages of trade partners. In conventional ﬁnancial
economics, banks mitigate the information gap between lenders and borrowers using their
monitoring abilities. According to James (1987), the role of banks is the production
of information unavailable to other lenders on borrowers. Recently, some studies (for
example, Petersen and Rajan (1997)) argue that trade partners have an information
advantage in monitoring the creditworthiness of borrowers because suppliers can acquire
information about the business conditions of their customers such as the timing and size
of customer orders or by visiting their premises. Empirically, they show that currently
unproﬁtable but growing ﬁrms (that is, ﬁrms with negative proﬁts and positive sales
growth) use trade credit more. These ﬁrms cannot acquire enough credit from banks,
so they argue that trade partners have an information advantage over banks. However,
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and Burkart et al. (2009) are more skeptical about the
information advantages of trade partners.
Additionally, and as already discussed, previous studies assume that the cost of trade
credit is extremely high compared to the cost of bank loans and investigate the reasons
why (Smith (1987), Petersen and Rajan (1994), and Ng et al. (1999)). For example,
Wilner (2000) argue that when customers fall into ﬁnancial distress, suppliers make more
concessions during debt renegotiation. To compensate for the losses from making these
concessions, suppliers then present higher ﬁnancial costs. Furthermore, Cunat (2007)
claim that suppliers are insurance providers for customers because it is costly to lose
their current customers. They show that suppliers oﬀer more trade credit during periods
when their customers face temporary liquidity shocks, so that the suppliers again have
higher ﬁnancial costs. In contrast, Marotta (2005) and Miwa and Ramseyer (2008) do
not support the arguments that the cost of trade credit is higher than for bank loans.
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Also, traditional studies, such as Meltzer (1960), show that the trend in trade credit
is countercyclical. Similarly, Nilsen (2002) argues that small ﬁrms increase their reliance
on trade credit during monetary contractions. Furthermore, using semiaggregated data,
Choi and Kim (2005) show that net trade credit for S&P 500 ﬁrms and smaller ﬁrms
increases during tighter monetary policy. These studies suggest that trade credit ab-
sorbs the negative eﬀects of tighter monetary policy. In contrast, Marotta (1997) ﬁnd no
evidence using Italian data that suppliers oﬀer credit to small ﬁrms during a monetary
squeeze. Love et al. (2007) also investigate the eﬀect of ﬁnancial crises on trade credit
in emerging economies. They observe the redistribution of bank credit from ﬁnancially
stronger ﬁrms to weaker ﬁrms using trade credit.
Our study shows that small businesses in ﬂuctuating industry sectors also use trade
credit more and bank loans less during recovery. The reason is that the information
asymmetry in these sectors is more severe, suggesting that trade partners oﬀer more
credit because they can mitigate the information problem more eﬀectively. Many previous
studies focus on the information advantage of trade creditors and banks, but few studies
investigate both trade credit and bank loans.4 In addition, creditworthy small businesses
increase trade credit to ﬁnance their new credit demand, suggesting that trade credit is
not inferior to bank loans. We cannot acquire information of the accurate price of trade
credit because ﬁrms use various and complicated trade credit contracts. To test whether
trade credit is inferior to bank loans, it is better to observe the choice of credit when
ﬁrms face the large and exogenous credit demand. We test information advantages and
inferiors in trade credit focusing on the eﬀects of the recovery from the severe recession
known as the lost decade as an exogenous shock to small businesses. Furthermore, we
use small business panel data so we can mitigate the endogeneity problem arising from
causality and unobservable omitted variables. Therefore, we consider our results robust.
4For example, Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that unproﬁtable ﬁrms with positive sales growth use
trade credit more, but do not investigate that these ﬁrms use bank loans less.
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We also ﬁnd that small businesses decrease trade credit during a recession and increase
during a recovery, implying that the trend in trade credit is procyclical.
The paper is organized as follows. Using small business data, Section 2 illustrates
the period of recovery from the “lost decade”. We provide some simple observations in
Section 3. We discuss the empirical results in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Business Fluctuations during 1997–2006
In this section, we illustrate economic conditions in Japan during 1997–2006 using ﬁrm-
level small business data.
2.1 Business Cycle after the Late 1990s
Following the asset price bubble of the late 1980s, the Japanese economy experienced
a severe recession. Many economists refer to this long recessionary period as the “lost
decade”.5 Especially after 1998, the recession became more severe. In late 1997, Yamaichi
Shouken, one of the largest securities trading ﬁrms in Japan, and the Hokkaido Takushoku
Bank, one of Japan’s largest banks, went bankrupt. Moreover, many nonﬁnancial ﬁrms
struggled with the economic downturn, and the number of ﬁrms declaring bankruptcy
increased. During this period, the real growth rate of GDP in Japan dropped to around
-2.0% in 1998 and -0.1% in 1999, which are the lowest rates of growth since World War II.
In 2000, the real growth rate of GDP improved to 2.9%, but the growth rate subsequently
fell to 0.2% in 2001 and 0.3% in 2002. After 2003, the real GDP growth rate recovered
to around 2%. The period after 2003 is then the period of recovery from the lost decade,
and represents the longest period of recovery since World War II.
5See Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for a more detailed discussion of the “lost decade”.
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2.2 Database of Small Businesses
In this study, we use ﬁrm-level data on small businesses in Japan from 1996 to 2006. The
data are from the Credit Risk Database for Small and Medium Enterprises (CRD). Several
ﬁnancial institutions and credit guarantee corporations under the guidance of the Small
Medium Enterprise Agency in Japan established this database. This database is managed
by the CRD Association.6 The data collection process targets ﬁrms deﬁned as Small and
Medium Enterprises under the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law. The dataset in
this study includes only corporations that existed for more than four consecutive years
in the CRD from 1996 to 2006. We omit ﬁnancial and small farm businesses. The data
collected on the 91,429 ﬁrms includes 91 items of their balance sheets and proﬁt and loss
statements data. For the number of employees, the ﬁrst quartile is 3, the median is 7,
and the third quartile is 16. The 99th percentile for employees is 214, suggesting that the
share of relatively larger ﬁrms in the sample is small.
2.3 Sales and Inventory Growth
We describe the performance of small business during 1997–2006, including the period
during and after the lost decade. The trend in the performance of small businesses
is consistent with ﬂuctuations in the overall business cycle. However, we can observe
some diﬀerences across industrial sectors. In Table 1, we show the median sales growth
rates by each industry.7 In 1998, 1999, and 2002, the sales of small businesses fell more
than 4%, although the impact of the sales decline varied by industry. In the 1998–1999
recession, the level of sales decline was very serious in manufacturing, especially in the
basic material, and processing and assembly sectors. The median growth rate of sales in
the basic material sector was -6.03% in 1998 and -9.95% in 1999, both lower than in the
6See http://www.crd-oﬃce.net/CRD/english/ for more information about the CRD.
7We divide the manufacturing sector into three categories, comprising the basic material sector, the
processing and assembly sector, and other.
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nonmanufacturing sectors. In addition, the median growth rate of sales in the processing
and assembly sector as the poorest performing sector was -2.50% in 1998 and -12.12%
in 1999. Nevertheless, these sectors also recovered rapidly following the recession. In
2000–2001, the processing and assembly sector enjoyed sales growth in excess of 2–4%,
despite other industries suﬀering sales declines. The basic material sector also experienced
positive sales growth, and the processing and assembly sector recovered very rapidly after
2002. In fact, the median growth rate of sales was positive in 2003, despite being still
negative in many other industries, and some 7.12% in 2004. Firms in the basic material
sector also increased sales by 3.59% in 2004.
These data suggest that business ﬂuctuations seriously aﬀect manufacturing, particu-
larly the processing and assembly, and basic material sectors. As shown in Table 1, the
range between the maximum and minimum median sales growth in the processing and
assembly sector during 1997–2006 is the largest, followed by the basic material sector. In
Table 2, we show the median growth rate of sales for each type of manufacturing. In some
sectors (Iron, Steel and Metal, General Machinery, and Electrical Machinery), median
sales dropped about 15% in 1999 and over 10% in 2002. In these sectors, the ﬂuctuations
were more serious when compared with other manufacturers. Figure 1 details the ratio of
ﬁrms that increased inventories by a large amount. We illustrate the ratio of ﬁrms whose
inventory growth rate exceeded 10%. After 2003, the ratio of ﬁrms with higher inventory
growth increased, and this appeared to be independent of industry.
These tables suggest that small businesses needed credit to ﬁnance inventory invest-
ment after 2003, especially in the manufacturing sector, as sales began to grow more
quickly. In addition, ﬁrms cannot easily anticipate immediate changes in economic situ-
ations. Therefore, during the period of recovery after 2003, they needed additional quick
money to ﬁnance their growth opportunities. To do this, creditors must acquire up-to-
date information. However, at the beginning of a recovery, creditors cannot decide the
creditworthiness of borrowers, as economic conditions are changing so rapidly.
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2.4 Business Fluctuations and Short-term Credit
In unstable industries such as the processing and assembly sector, ﬁrms and creditors
encounter some problems. First, ﬁrms in unstable industries have unexpected credit
demands. Generally, ﬁrms must ﬁnance inventories and trade receivables when sales for
ﬁrms are growing. Firms with growth opportunities must then ﬁnance short-term credit
if they do not have suﬃcient cash holdings. Accordingly, if they can plan when they need
credit, they do not require immediate short-term credit. However, it is diﬃcult for ﬁrms in
unstable industries to predict when they need short-term credit for sales growth because
growth opportunities can appear suddenly. Second, in these sorts of industries, creditors
require day-by-day monitoring of the credit risk of borrowers. As the information gap
between creditors and borrowers is severe in unstable industries, only creditors that have
updated information about these industries and borrowers can then oﬀer credit.
As discussed, the demand for short-term credit increased during the period of recovery
from the lost decade. During this time, if borrowers needed credit immediately, creditors
did not have enough time to observe the default risk of the borrowers. Additionally,
if creditors do not have updated information about borrowers, they cannot oﬀer credit.
Before 2002, the Japanese economy suﬀered a large and serious recession, so creditors had
dated information that may well have judged the borrower’s investments as bad, even if
they were now proﬁtable. The major creditors for small businesses are banks and trade
creditors. Small businesses with growth opportunities use credit from banks or suppliers
that can mitigate these problems during the period. 8
The pecking order theory maintains that in the ﬁrst instance ﬁrms choose internal cash
as the cheapest ﬁnance source available. Firms exhausting internal cash then use their
next cheapest alternative source of funds. On this basis, if trade credit is an extremely
expensive source of ﬁnance, ﬁrms do not use it to ﬁnance inventory investment. Previous
8To simplify the discussion, we do not consider other means of ﬁnancing such as cash holdings, the
collection of trade receivables, and the discounting of bill receivables.
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studies of relationship lending (for example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) and (1997)) argue
that small businesses only use trade credit if bank loans are unavailable. This literature
then implies that small business (especially creditworthy ﬁrms) use bank loans to ﬁnance
inventory investment and trade credit only if bank loans are unavailable. In addition,
many previous papers (for example, James (1987)) have supported information-based
theory and focus on the bank role in mitigating the information asymmetry between
creditors and borrowers. If true, banks oﬀer more credit for small businesses with credit
demand. However, as Petersen and Rajan (1997) have argued, if trade partners have an
information advantage over banks, they oﬀer more credit instead.
3 Overviews of Firm-level Data
According to Petersen and Rajan (1997), the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities determine
its credit demands, including asset maturity, liquidity, and access to credit from ﬁnancial
institutions. During the recovery, ﬁrm sales grew quickly and inventory investment oppor-
tunities expanded. To ﬁnance these investment opportunities, ﬁrms with higher inventory
growth had higher credit demand and needed larger amounts of short-term credit. In this
section, we use the inventory growth rate as a proxy for credit demand. As the amount
of inventory in some ﬁrms is zero, we deﬁne the inventory growth rate as (inventory in
year t – inventory in year t-1)/total asset in t-1. We investigate what sources of ﬁnance
small businesses with higher credit demands use. We divide our sample into four groups
using the inventory growth rate: less than -1%, between -1% and 0%, between 0% and
1%, and more than 1%.
Table 3 provides the median trade payables, short-term borrowings, and long-term
borrowings ratios normalized by total assets. Most of short and long-term borrowings
are from banks, so these are proxies for bank lending. The largest ﬁnancial sources
are long-term borrowings, accounting for more than 40% of total assets. The median
11
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short-term borrowings and trade payables are about 10% of total assets. As Miwa and
Ramseyer (2008) argue, the amount of trade payables in Japan is higher than that of short-
term borrowings. As already mentioned, the CRD is a database drawn from ﬁnancial
institutions, so our data show that the amount of short-term borrowings is higher than
trade payables. In Table 4, we show the ratios of cash holdings, trade receivables, and
inventories normalized by total assets. The median ratio of cash holdings to total assets
exceeds 10%, and this is higher than the ratio of short-term borrowings.9 The median
ratio of trade receivables is larger than that of cash holdings and inventories, accounting
for about 19% of total assets. These ﬁndings suggest that small businesses have suﬃcient
ﬁnancial assets and can easily ﬁnance inventory investment using cash holdings and by
collecting trade receivables. To simplify the discussion, we focus only on trade credit and
bank loans in this section.
3.1 Trends in Trade Credit and Bank Loans
Table 5 provides the growth rate quartiles for short-term borrowings. Generally, the 25th
and 75th percentiles of growth rates will be larger if the inventory growth rates are higher.
However, all of the median growth rates are 0.00%, and so do not depend on the inventory
growth rate or year. These data show that banks do not increase credit for small ﬁrms
with positive inventory growth, implying that they tend to roll over loans and not oﬀer
new loans to those small businesses with more need of ﬁnance.
The trend in trade payables is diﬀerent from that for short-term borrowings. In Table
6, we provide the ﬁrst, second, and third quartiles of the trade payables growth rate. This
table shows that the distribution of the growth rate is higher when the inventory growth
rates are higher. For example, in 2003 the median growth rate of trade payables for ﬁrms
with the highest inventory growth is 0.462%. However, the growth rate for ﬁrms with the
9Japanese small businesses are not extraordinary in this regard. According to Bank of England (2004),
total deposits are greater than total borrowing in small ﬁrms.
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lowest inventory growth in the same year is only -0.455%. Additionally, the growth rates
of trade payables vary with the economic conditions. During the recession in 1998, 1999,
and 2002, the median growth rates of trade payables are either 0.00% or negative, even if
the inventory growth rate is in the highest group. In 2000 and 2004, that is, the period
of recovery after the recession, the trade payables growth is higher than the rates in the
other periods. In Table 7, we use the ratio of the annual change in trade payables to sales
as a proxy for trade credit. If we change the proxy, the results are similar.
3.2 Comparisons by the Level of Sales and Inventory Growth
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with increasing inventories use more trade credit. As our data are from
a ﬁrm’s balance sheet, increasing inventories arises from both unsold goods and inventory
investment. To exclude the presence of unsold goods, we divide the sample by the level
of sales growth. Firms with higher sales growth have less unsold inventory, so we can
identify those ﬁrms with increasing unsold inventories or growth opportunities. In Table
8 and Table 9, we divide the sample into four groups according to sales growth: less than
-10%, between -10% and 0%, between 0% and 10%, and more than 10%. Table 8 depicts
the growth in median short-term borrowings. The median short-term growth is 0.00% if
we limit the sample to ﬁrms with higher sales and inventories growth. Table 9 provides
the median trade payables growth divided by the level of inventories and sales growth. As
shown, the median trade payables growth rate is negative if we limit the sample to ﬁrms
with higher inventories growth and greater falls in sales, although the trade payables
growth rate of ﬁrms with increasing inventories and sales is positive. These ﬁndings
suggest that suppliers decrease credit to ﬁrms with increasing unsold inventories.
3.3 Comparisons by Industry
In Panel A of Table 10, we provide the median trade payables growth rate divided by
the three types of manufacturers. To simplify, we limit the sample to ﬁrms with positive
13
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inventories growth. The median trade payables growth is positive in the basic material
and processing and assembly sectors in 2000 and again after 2003. However, the median
growth rate is smaller for the other manufacturers. These results are similar when we
focus on the ﬁrst and third quartiles of the growth rate of trade payables. As mentioned,
the performance of the processing and assembly sector is unstable. These results sug-
gest that ﬁrms in unstable industries use more trade credit when they have short-term
credit demand. The median short-term borrowings growth rate is 0.00%, except for other
manufacturers in 1997. This suggests that manufacturers do not increase short-term
borrowings, whether in recession or recovery, to invest in inventory.
3.4 Creditworthiness and the Choice of Financial Sources
Previous studies have argued that small businesses use trade credit when they cannot
borrow from banks. In Subsection 3.1, we show that small businesses use trade credit to
ﬁnance inventory investments, but this may arise through the unavailability of bank loans.
To investigate whether small businesses use trade credit because of the unavailability of
bank loans, we limit the sample to creditworthy ﬁrms. Creditworthy ﬁrms can easily
access bank loans, so they borrow from banks to ﬁnance their credit demands if the
cost of trade credit is extremely high. We use the ratio of tangible ﬁxed assets to total
borrowings as a proxy for creditworthiness because ﬁrms with more tangible ﬁxed assets
have more collateral assets. Because ﬁrms with a lower amount of borrowing can pledge
more of their assets to banks, we can consider these ﬁrms as creditworthy.10
In Table 11, we provide the median trade payables and short-term borrowings growth
divided by the level of collateral assets at the beginning of each ﬁscal year. Panel A shows
the median trade payables growth rate. On the right-hand side of this table, we specify
the sample where the inventory growth rate exceeds 1%. Apart from 1999 and 2000,
10The data show that ﬁrms with higher ﬁxed tangible assets pay lower interest spreads, so this ratio is
a suitable proxy for creditworthiness.
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the median rates are positive, independent of the level of collateral. If we use the sample
where the inventory growth is between 0% and 1%, the median trade payables growth also
does not depend on the level of collateral assets. Panel B of Table 11 provides the ratios
of the median short-term growth rates to the level of collateral assets. All median growth
rates are 0% irrespective of the level of collaterals and the year. These results show that
small businesses use trade credit if they have suﬃcient collateral assets. Creditworthy
ﬁrms then increase trade credit to ﬁnance inventory investment, implying that the use of
trade credit is not caused by unavailability of bank loans
4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Regression
To investigate whether ﬁrms use bank loans or trade credit, we estimate the following
equation using CRD data.
Short− term Borrowings Growthit = α1 + α2Credit Demandit +Xitα3 (1)
+ ΣαT4 Y ear Dummyt + it
X = (Firm scale, Current assets excluding cash, ROA, Collateral assets, Cash holdings,
Leverage, Interest rate, Regional dummies, Industrial dummies)
T = 2003–2006
where Xit is a matrix of control variables, and it is the error term of ﬁrm i in year
t. We specify the trade payables growth rate as the dependent variable and estimate a
similar equation to investigate whether ﬁrms use bank loans or trade credit.
Trade Payables Growthit = β1 + β2Credit Demandit +Xitβ3 (2)
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+ ΣβT4 Y ear Dummyt + ζit
X = (Firm scale, Current assets excluding cash, ROA, Collateral assets, Cash holdings,
Leverage, Interest rate, Regional dummies, Industrial dummies)
T = 2003–2006
where Xit is a matrix of control variables, and ζit is the error term of ﬁrm i in year t.
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In addition, we specify the annual change in the trade payables to current liability ratio
and the short-term borrowings to current liability ratio as dependent variables, following
to Kashyap et al. (1993) and Borensztein and Lee (2002). This is because total short-
term demand aﬀects the growth rates of trade payables and short-term borrowings. By
normalizing with current liabilities, we can then account for the increase in the ratio of
trade payables or short-term borrowings after eliminating the eﬀects of total short-term
demand because current liabilities already reﬂect these eﬀects. Increases in the trade
payables to current liabilities ratio means that ﬁrms use trade credit more than bank
loans.
4.2 Hypothesis
We hypothesize that if banks oﬀer cheaper credit and have more up-to-date information
on borrowers than other creditors, borrowers use bank loans more to ﬁnance their credit
demand. In this case, the eﬀect of Credit Demand it for short-term borrowings growth is
positive and larger than the eﬀect for trade payables growth. Further, Credit Demand it
has a negative eﬀect on the ratio of trade payables to current liabilities. However, if trade
creditors have more information and oﬀer credit immediately, borrowers will use trade
credit. Accordingly, the coeﬃcient of Credit Demand it is positive for the trade payables
growth rate and the magnitude is larger. Particularly in unstable industries, ﬁrms obtain
funds from creditors, who can more easily acquire information.
11We assume that the correlation between ζit and it is close to zero.
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We also investigate whether credit-constrained ﬁrms use more trade credit. If ﬁrms use
trade credit because of the lower availability of bank loans, credit-constrained ﬁrms with
greater need of ﬁnance will use more trade credit. In addition, wealthy ﬁrms increase bank
loans to ﬁnance their short-term credit demand. Thus, the eﬀects of Credit Demand it for
trade credit growth are larger in the case of credit-constrained ﬁrms. If trade credit is
extremely expensive, creditworthy ﬁrms use more bank loans, instead of trade credit. As
a result, the eﬀects of Credit Demand it on bank loans are positive and the eﬀect on trade
credit is not signiﬁcant for wealthy ﬁrms if bank loans are superior to trade credit. We
use the inventory growth rate as a proxy for credit demand. Growing ﬁrms also need
more working capital and short-term credit, so we employ sales growth as an alternative
proxy for credit demand.
We include several control variables in the regressions. The current asset ratio is the
ratio of current assets (excluding cash) to total assets. Because ﬁrms with a higher current
asset ratio ﬁnance their working capital needs until maturity, they must increase trade
credit and/or short-term bank credit. Thus, we hypothesize that the coeﬃcient on the
current asset ratio is positive. Cash to current liabilities ratio represents the liquidity of
ﬁrms such that ﬁrms with a lower level of liquidity are not likely to pay oﬀ their credit
promptly on the due date. Therefore, the credit risk of these ﬁrms is higher and creditors
are more likely to reduce credit to these ﬁrms. We hypothesize that the coeﬃcient on the
cash to current liabilities ratio is positive for trade payables and short-term borrowings
growth. The tangible asset ratio is a proxy for collateral assets. According to Uesugi et al.
(2009), banks in Japan are secured lenders whereas trade partners are unsecured lenders.
As a result, ﬁrms that have more tangible assets use more bank loans, so the coeﬃcient
on the tangible asset ratio is positive for short-term borrowings.
We can also calculate the average interest rate on bank credit using the ﬁrm’s balance
sheets and proﬁt and loss statements. The interest rate on bank credit has a negative
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eﬀect on short-term borrowings and a positive eﬀect on trade payables. 12 We hypothesize
that the coeﬃcients for the levels and changes in interest rates are negative for short-term
borrowings and positive for trade payables. The return on assets (ROA) is an indicator
of ﬁrm performance. In general, better-performing ﬁrms have suﬃcient cash ﬂow, so they
do not need more short-term credit. On the other hand, poorly performing ﬁrms are more
likely to default, so creditors reduce the credit supply to these ﬁrms. In sum, the level of
ROA has some eﬀects for trade payables and short-term borrowings, although the signs of
the coeﬃcients are ambiguous. We use leverage as a proxy for credit risk. We hypothesize
that the coeﬃcients on leverage are negative because the probability of default for more
highly leveraged ﬁrms is greater. We include the natural logarithm of 1+sales13, along
with industrial, regional, and year dummies.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Main Results
In column (1) of Table 13, we provide the results for the estimation of short-term bor-
rowings. The coeﬃcient of inventories growth rates is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. This implies that ﬁrms with increasing inventories borrow more from
banks. Similarly, in column (2) of Table 13, we specify the trade payables growth rate
as the dependent variable. The coeﬃcient for the inventories growth rate is also positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. However, the result for short-term borrowings is not robust.
If we change the proxy for short-term borrowings to the ratio of short-term borrowings
to current liabilities, the coeﬃcient for inventories growth becomes insigniﬁcant (column
(3)), despite the eﬀect of inventories growth on the ratio of trade payables to current lia-
bilities being signiﬁcantly positive (column (4)). These results suggest that ﬁrms increase
12Tsuruta (2008) conclude the positive eﬀect of interest rates on bank credit for trade payables using
Japanese small business data.
13When the sales of ﬁrms are zero, we specify one.
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trade credit more to ﬁnance inventories investment. We also ﬁnd that growing ﬁrms in-
crease trade payables, but not short-term borrowings. The eﬀects of sales growth are
signiﬁcantly positive for trade payables and negative for short-term borrowings (columns
(1) and (2)). If we change the proxies of short-term borrowings and trade payables, the
results are similar (columns (3) and (4)). These ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms ﬁnance their
growth opportunities using trade credit, not bank loans.
The results for the control variables ﬁt our hypotheses apart from some ﬁndings. The
eﬀects of current assets are signiﬁcantly positive for short-tem borrowings and negative
for trade payables, suggesting that ﬁrms with demand for short-term credit increase short-
term borrowings more. The coeﬃcients of cash holdings are signiﬁcantly negative. These
ﬁndings show that both trade partners and banks decrease credit to ﬁrms with lower
liquidity. The tangible asset ratio, as a proxy for collateral assets, has a negative eﬀect
on trade payables and a positive eﬀect on short-term borrowings. Firms with suﬃcient
collateral assets then increase short-term borrowings more and trade payables less. In
addition, apart from column (2), the coeﬃcients for the level and change in interest rates
are signiﬁcantly negative for short-term borrowings and negative for trade payables. These
results are consistent with our hypothesis. The results for the year dummies illustrate the
diﬀerences between trade payables and short-term borrowings. The coeﬃcient for 2004
(the beginning of the recovery), is positive for trade payables and negative for short-term
borrowings. That is, at the beginning of the recovery, ﬁrms use trade payables more and
short-term borrowings less.
As mentioned, unsold products may account for the increase in inventories. The results
in Table 13 include the cases of both an increase in unsold products and an increase
in inventory investment. To investigate only the eﬀects of inventory growth caused by
inventory investment, we add a proxy of inventory increase caused by unsold products.
We use the rate of inventory increase in the case of sales decrease.14 If growing ﬁrms
14This variable is deﬁned as “(inventoryt-inventoryt − 1)/assetst − 1 if the inventory growth ratet is
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with inventory investment use trade credit or bank loans more, and ﬁrms with unsold
products use trade credit or bank loans less, the coeﬃcients of the inventory increase in
the case of sales decrease are negative. Table 14 shows that the coeﬃcients for “inventory
increase if sales growth is negative” are statistically negative for trade payables growth
at the 1% level. This suggests that growing ﬁrms with higher inventory growth increase
trade credit more and ﬁrms with unsold inventories increase trade credit less (column
(2)). The coeﬃcient of the proxy of unsold inventory increases for short-term borrowings
is positive, but not statistically signiﬁcant (column (1)). In columns (3) and (4), we
use short-term borrowings and trade payables normalized by current liabilities. The
coeﬃcient of “inventory increase if sales growth is negative” for short-term borrowings–
current liability is signiﬁcantly positive. The eﬀect of this variable for the trade payables
growth rate is statistically negative at 1% level, and the coeﬃcients of sales and inventory
growth are statistically positive at 1% level. In summary, our results imply that growing
ﬁrms with inventory investment increase trade credit use and ﬁrms with inventory increase
caused by unsold products use trade credit less.
These results may be biased because of endogeneity. This is because the inventories of
small businesses are aﬀected by credit constraints, so the direction of causality between
inventory growth and short-term borrowings or trade payables growth is ambiguous. In
particular, if the growth rates of short-term borrowings and trade payables have a positive
eﬀect on the inventory growth rate, the coeﬃcients for the inventory growth rate are
upwardly biased. However, as our data are limited to the period of recovery, we do
not consider these problems serious, as follows. To start with, the ﬁnancial condition
of ﬁrms and the macro business cycle determine the inventory growth rate. During the
recovery period, the improving business cycle mainly causes the (exogenous) increase in
ﬁrm inventories. Therefore, short-term borrowings and trade payables growth have little
inﬂuence on inventories growth. Furthermore, we also use the annual change in trade
positive and sales growtht is negative, and zero otherwise.
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payables or short-term borrowings ratio as a dependent variables, which has insigniﬁcant
eﬀects on inventory growth. We obtain similar eﬀects if we change the dependent variable,
so our results are not biased.
5.2 Comparisons by Industry
To investigate the diﬀerent eﬀects of credit demand by industry, we divide the sample
according to the type of industry in Tables 15–18. In Table 15, we regress the short-
term borrowings growth rate as a dependent variable. The coeﬃcients for the inventory
growth rate are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, and do not depend on the industry
type. Focusing on the magnitude of the coeﬃcients, we observe some diﬀerences across
industries. The eﬀect of inventory growth is largest for other manufacturers and second
largest for basic materials. These results imply that manufacturers in other sectors use
bank loans to ﬁnance inventory growth more.
We obtain diﬀerent results in Table 16 where the dependent variable is changed to
trade payables growth. The coeﬃcients for the inventory growth rate are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient for the inventory
growth rate is largest for the processing and assembly sectors and smallest for the other
sector. Those results are diﬀerent to the results for short-term borrowings in Table 15,
suggesting that manufacturers in the processing and assembly sector use trade credit
instead of bank loans to ﬁnance the increase in inventories. Similarly, the eﬀects of sales
growth in the basic material sector and processing and assembly sector are statistically
larger than those in the other sectors.
To check robustness, we change the dependent variable to the annual increase in
short-tem borrowings and trade payables normalized by current liabilities. The results
are shown in Tables 17 and 18. In the short-term borrowings estimation in Table 17,
the coeﬃcient of inventory growth and sales growth is negative apart from the result for
other industries in column (3). Conversely, in the trade payables estimation in Table 18,
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the coeﬃcients of sales growth and inventory growth are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1%
level, independent of the type of industry. In addition, the magnitude of coeﬃcients in
the basic material sector and processing and assembly sector is statistically larger than
in other industries. As discussed, the performance of the basic material sector and the
processing and assembly sector is unstable. We conclude that growing ﬁrms in unstable
industries use trade credit instead of bank loans.
5.3 Wealthy Firms and Trade Credit Use
According to previous work, small businesses with a low availability of bank loans use trade
credit more, because the cost of trade credit is extremely high. For example, Burkart and
Ellingsen (2004) show that medium- and low-wealth ﬁrms use trade credit because they
need to ease bank credit rationing. Generally, small businesses with high collateral assets
can borrow suﬃcient money from banks. If small businesses increase trade credit because
of the low availability of bank loans, growing small businesses with higher collateral assets
use bank credit instead of trade credit. In Table 19 and Table 20, we regress Equations
(1) and (2) after dividing the sample by the level of collateral assets. We use the ratio of
tangible ﬁxed assets to total borrowings as a proxy for collateral assets. In the current
analysis, we classify ﬁrms in the bottom third of the tangible asset ratio as ﬁrms with
low collateral assets. Similarly, we classify ﬁrms in the middle third of the tangible asset
ratio as middle collateral asset ﬁrms and those in the highest third as high collateral asset
ﬁrms. 15
Table 19 shows the results of the estimation for short-term borrowings. The coeﬃcients
for the inventory growth rate are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, independent of
the level of collateral assets. However, the coeﬃcients for sales growth are signiﬁcantly
negative, even if the sample is limited to ﬁrms with high collateral assets. Our ﬁndings
15Using this deﬁnition, in this sample, ﬁrms whose tangible asset ratio is less than 0.4009 are low
collateral ﬁrms, ﬁrms with a tangible asset ratio between 0.4009 and 0.8106 are middle collateral ﬁrms,
and those with a tangible asset ratio over 0.810 are high collateral ﬁrms.
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show that growing ﬁrms decrease short-term borrowings, although they still have growth
opportunities. Table 20 shows the results for the estimation of trade credit. Contrary
to the results for short-term borrowings, wealthy growing ﬁrms use trade credit instead
of short-term borrowings. The coeﬃcients for the inventory growth rate are signiﬁcantly
positive at the 1% level and those eﬀects are statistically larger when the amount of
collateral is higher. These results are similar to the results for sales growth. In general,
these ﬁndings do not support the hypothesis that ﬁrms use trade credit more because of
the lower availability of bank loans.
The magnitude of the inventory growth rate to short-term borrowings is smaller for
the sample of the wealthiest ﬁrms. This shows that they do not use bank loans even
though they have suﬃcient collateral assets. The reason is as follows. Growing ﬁrms and
ﬁrms with more inventory investment need quick credit. Because banks need more time
screening ﬁrms than do trade partners, they cannot oﬀer quick credit to growing small
businesses. Therefore, growing ﬁrms use trade credit more, even though they have enough
collateral assets.
5.4 Leveraged Firms and Trade Credit Use
To investigate the eﬀects of ﬁrm creditworthiness, we use leverage as a proxy for credit-
worthiness and estimate both after dividing the sample by leverage. The level of leverage
is positively associated with credit risk.16 Lower leveraged ﬁrms, that is, ﬁrms with lower
credit risk, can use bank loans more easily. If ﬁrms have an incentive to use bank loans
rather than trade credit to ﬁnance their working capital, lower leveraged ﬁrms increase
bank loans more compared to more highly leveraged ﬁrms.
We divide our samples into three by the level of leverage. We classify ﬁrms as “low”
leverage if their leverage is in the bottom third of the sample. Similarly, if leverage is in
the middle third of the sample we classify ﬁrms as “middle” leverage, and ﬁrms in the
16For example, Opler and Titman (1994) use leverage as a proxy of ﬁnancial distress.
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top third of the sample as “high” leverage.17 Table 21 provides the result for the short-
term borrowings estimation. The coeﬃcients of inventory growth rate are signiﬁcantly
positive at the 1% level and independent of the level of leverage. The magnitudes of these
coeﬃcients are statistically larger if leverage is low. The results of sales growth rely on
the level of leverage. The eﬀect of sales growth in high leveraged ﬁrms is negative, but in
low and middle leveraged ﬁrms is positive. These results imply that lower leveraged ﬁrms
with higher growth opportunities increase short-term borrowings more.
Table 22 provides the result of the trade payables estimation for each level of leverage.
The coeﬃcients for the inventory growth rate are also signiﬁcantly positive, independent
of the level of leverage. Moreover, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient for the low leverage
group is statistically larger than for the high and middle leverage groups. The coeﬃcients
of sales growth are signiﬁcantly positive for all groups. Similarly, the positive eﬀect is large
if we limit the sample to low leverage ﬁrms. These results suggest that lower leveraged
ﬁrms with higher growth opportunities also increase trade payables more. From these
results, lower leveraged ﬁrms increase trade credit, and not only bank loans, to ﬁnance
their growth opportunities.
6 Conclusions
We investigated how small businesses ﬁnance their growth opportunities using ﬁrm-level
data during the period of recovery from the “lost decade” in Japan. We ﬁnd the following
results. First, small businesses with higher credit demand increase trade credit instead of
bank loans. Second, small businesses with greater collateral assets also use trade credit
more to ﬁnance their working capital. Many previous studies argue that small businesses
in ﬁnancially developed countries use bank loans, and trade credit only if bank loans
17Using this deﬁnition, in our sample, ﬁrms with leverage less than 0.7775 are low leverage, ﬁrms with
leverage between 0.7775 and 0.9572 are middle leverage, and ﬁrms with leverage over 0.95723 are high
leverage.
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are unavailable. In addition, ﬁrms in ﬁnancially developing counties use trade credit
more as they cannot borrow enough money from banks. Our ﬁndings suggest that small
businesses in ﬁnancially developed countries use trade credit more and this is not from
the lack of availability of bank loans. Third, small businesses with unstable industries use
trade credit more to ﬁnance their working capital, suggesting that trade creditors have
an advantage in the day-by-day monitoring of borrowers.
Appendix: Deﬁnition of Variables
t denotes year t and t-1 denotes year t-1.
Dependent variables
Short-term Borrowings Growth Rate The annual growth rate of a ﬁrm’s short-term
borrowings [(short-term borrowingst – short-term borrowingst−1)/total assetst−1].
Trade Payables Growth Rate The annual growth rate of a ﬁrm’s trade payables [(trade
payablest – trade payablest−1)/total assetst−1].
Annual Change in Short-term Borrowings – Current Liabilities Ratio The an-
nual change in the ratio of trade payables to current liabilities (short-term borrowingst/current
liabilitiest – short-term borrowingst−1/current liabilitiest−1).
Annual Change in Trade Payables – Current Liabilities Ratio The annual change
in the ratio of trade payables to current liabilities (trade payablest/current liabilitiest
– trade payablest−1/current liabilitiest−1).
Credit Demand
Inventory Growth Rate The annual growth rate of a ﬁrm’s inventories [(inventoriest-
inventoriest−1)/total assetst−1].
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Sales Growth Rate The annual growth rate of a ﬁrm’s sales [(salest-salest−1)/total
assetst−1].
Cash holdings
Cash–Short-term Loan Ratio Cash/Short-term loans.
Credit risk
Leverage = Total debts/assets in t-1.
Other proxies of the demand for short-term credit
Scale Ln(1+salest−1) in t-1.
Current Asset Ratio The ratio of current assets excluding cash to total assets in t-1.
ROA The ratio of the sum of a ﬁrm’s operating income, interest receivables, and divi-
dends to total assets in t-1.
Availability of bank loans
Tangible Asset Ratio The ratio of a ﬁrm’s tangible assets (the sum of the book value
of buildings and land) to total debts in t-1.
Interest Rate The ratio of a ﬁrm’s interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt,
long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable, minus the prime rate in t-1 (in
percentages). We do not have data on the prime rate for each bank. Therefore,
we obtained the short-term prime rate at the end of March from the Financial and
Economics Statistics Monthly issued by the Bank of Japan.
Annual Change in Interest Rate Interest ratet – Interest ratet−1
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Table 3: The Median Ratios of Trade Payables and Short- and Long-term Borrowings
(Normalized by Total Assets)
Trade Payables ST Borrowings LT Borrowings
1996–2002 0.0979 0.1191 0.4023
2003–2006 0.0849 0.1000 0.4248
Total 0.0919 0.1107 0.4118
Table 4: The Median Ratios of Cash Holdings, Trade Receivables, and Inventories
(Normalized by Total Assets)
Cash Holdings Trade Receivables Inventories
1996–2002 0.1280 0.1927 0.0582
2003–2006 0.1223 0.1916 0.0577
Total 0.1256 0.1922 0.0580
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Figure 1: The Ratio of Firms whose Inventory Growth Rate exceeds 10%
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Table 10: Growth Rates of Trade Payables and Short-term Borrowings, by Industry
0% < Inventory Growth ≤ 1% 1% < Inventory Growth
Industry Basic Processing Others Total Basic Processing Others Total
Material and Assembly Material and Assembly
1997 0.14% 0.29% 0.00% 0.06% 1.04% 2.01% 0.48% 1.01%
1998 -0.84% -0.57% -0.27% -0.53% -0.68% 0.00% 0.00% -0.19%
1999 -0.40% -0.50% -0.11% -0.29% -0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2000 0.30% 0.41% 0.00% 0.17% 0.91% 2.40% 0.20% 0.99%
2001 -0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 1.02% 0.24% 0.41%
2002 -0.38% -0.16% -0.12% -0.20% -0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2003 0.04% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.60% 1.18% 0.04% 0.48%
2004 0.29% 0.34% 0.00% 0.12% 1.28% 1.89% 0.21% 0.96%
2005 0.10% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.84% 1.14% 0.00% 0.51%
2006 0.11% 0.13% 0.00% 0.03% 0.77% 1.37% 0.18% 0.65%
Panel B: Median Short-term Borrowings Growth
0% < Inventory Growth ≤ 1% 1% < Inventory Growth
Industry Basic Processing Others Total Basic Processing Others Total
Material and Assembly Material and Assembly
1997 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1998 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1999 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2000 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2001 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2002 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2003 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2004 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2005 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2006 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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Table 11: Growth Rates of Trade Payables and Short-term Borrowings, by Amount of
Collateral Assets
Panel A: Median Trade Payables Growth
0% < Inventory Growth ≤ 1% 1% < Inventory Growth
Collateral Assets Low Middle High Total Low Middle High Total
1997 0.00% 0.10% 0.09% 0.07% 1.12% 0.94% 1.03% 1.01%
1998 -0.56% -0.61% -0.50% -0.55% -0.07% -0.27% -0.16% -0.18%
1999 -0.38% -0.28% -0.29% -0.30% -0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2000 0.11% 0.13% 0.20% 0.17% 1.03% 0.95% 0.95% 0.97%
2001 0.00% -0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 0.40% 0.46% 0.38%
2002 -0.19% -0.28% -0.16% -0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2003 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.34% 0.38% 0.68% 0.46%
2004 0.01% 0.09% 0.16% 0.12% 0.81% 0.85% 1.08% 0.92%
2005 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.28% 0.50% 0.68% 0.50%
2006 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.03% 0.51% 0.58% 0.83% 0.65%
Panel B: Median Short-term Borrowings Growth
0% < Inventory Growth ≤ 1% 1% < Inventory Growth
Collateral Assets Low Middle High Total Low Middle High Total
1997 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1998 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1999 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2000 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2001 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2002 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2003 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2004 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2005 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2006 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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Table 13: Credit Demand and Growth of Trade Credit and Short-term Borrowings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Short-term Trade ST Borrowings Trade Payables
Borrowings Payables – C. Liability – C. Liability
Inventory Growth Rate 0.18887∗∗∗ 0.26332∗∗∗ 0.01258 0.16717∗∗∗
(0.00614) (0.00453) (0.00902) (0.00831)
Sales Growth Rate -0.00434∗∗∗ 0.04937∗∗∗ -0.04674∗∗∗ 0.02962∗∗∗
(0.00073) (0.00080) (0.00120) (0.00103)
Current Asset Ratio 0.01103∗∗∗ -0.00475∗∗∗ 0.03821∗∗∗ -0.02817∗∗∗
(0.00107) (0.00066) (0.00172) (0.00142)
Cash–C. Liability Ratio 0.00478∗∗∗ 0.00131∗∗∗ 0.01272∗∗∗ -0.00606∗∗∗
(0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00041) (0.00038)
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.00288∗∗∗ -0.00083∗∗∗ 0.00702∗∗∗ -0.00215∗∗∗
(0.00017) (0.00012) (0.00034) (0.00030)
Interest Rate -0.00256∗∗∗ 0.00027∗∗ -0.00214∗∗∗ 0.00064∗∗∗
(0.00017) (0.00011) (0.00028) (0.00023)
Annual Change -0.01561∗∗∗ 0.00010 -0.02134∗∗∗ 0.00561∗∗∗
in Interest Rate (0.00027) (0.00016) (0.00044) (0.00035)
ROA -0.04889∗∗∗ -0.01023∗∗∗ -0.00486 0.00897∗∗∗
(0.00284) (0.00143) (0.00379) (0.00289)
Leverage 0.00115∗ 0.00161∗∗∗ 0.00655∗∗∗ -0.00113∗
(0.00068) (0.00031) (0.00080) (0.00058)
ln(1+sales) 0.00063∗∗∗ 0.00067∗∗∗ 0.00237∗∗∗ -0.00041∗∗
(0.00013) (0.00007) (0.00022) (0.00017)
year==2004 -0.00364∗∗∗ 0.00302∗∗∗ -0.00709∗∗∗ 0.00604∗∗∗
(0.00051) (0.00030) (0.00084) (0.00068)
year==2005 -0.00152∗∗∗ -0.00083∗∗∗ -0.00406∗∗∗ -0.00308∗∗∗
(0.00051) (0.00030) (0.00085) (0.00069)
year==2006 0.00084 0.00032 -0.00012 -0.00037
(0.00052) (0.00031) (0.00088) (0.00071)
Observations 295,515 295,952 297,697 297,697
R-squared 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.03
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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Table 14: Credit Demand, Sales Growth, and Growth of Trade Credit and Short-term
Borrowings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Short-term Trade ST Borrowings Trade Payables
Borrowings Payables – C. Liability – C. Liability
Inventory Growth Rate 0.18482∗∗∗ 0.30387∗∗∗ -0.01099 0.19260∗∗∗
(0.00721) (0.00562) (0.01063) (0.00984)
Inventory Increase 0.01564 -0.15518∗∗∗ 0.09108∗∗∗ -0.09828∗∗∗
if Sales Growth is Negative (0.01558) (0.01134) (0.02300) (0.02090)
Sales Growth -0.00416∗∗∗ 0.04758∗∗∗ -0.04571∗∗∗ 0.02850∗∗∗
(0.00075) (0.00082) (0.00125) (0.00107)
Current Asset Ratio 0.01087∗∗∗ -0.00315∗∗∗ 0.03727∗∗∗ -0.02716∗∗∗
(0.00108) (0.00067) (0.00173) (0.00143)
Cash-C.Liability Ratio 0.00478∗∗∗ 0.00132∗∗∗ 0.01272∗∗∗ -0.00606∗∗∗
(0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00041) (0.00038)
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.00289∗∗∗ -0.00088∗∗∗ 0.00705∗∗∗ -0.00219∗∗∗
(0.00017) (0.00012) (0.00034) (0.00030)
Interest Rate -0.00256∗∗∗ 0.00029∗∗∗ -0.00216∗∗∗ 0.00065∗∗∗
(0.00017) (0.00011) (0.00028) (0.00023)
Annual Change -0.01561∗∗∗ 0.00011 -0.02135∗∗∗ 0.00561∗∗∗
in Interest Rate (0.00027) (0.00016) (0.00044) (0.00035)
ROA -0.04888∗∗∗ -0.01036∗∗∗ -0.00478 0.00888∗∗∗
(0.00284) (0.00143) (0.00379) (0.00289)
Leverage 0.00115∗ 0.00161∗∗∗ 0.00655∗∗∗ -0.00113∗
(0.00068) (0.00031) (0.00080) (0.00058)
ln(1+sales) 0.00063∗∗∗ 0.00060∗∗∗ 0.00241∗∗∗ -0.00045∗∗∗
(0.00013) (0.00007) (0.00022) (0.00017)
year==2004 -0.00363∗∗∗ 0.00296∗∗∗ -0.00706∗∗∗ 0.00601∗∗∗
(0.00051) (0.00030) (0.00084) (0.00068)
year==2005 -0.00151∗∗∗ -0.00088∗∗∗ -0.00404∗∗∗ -0.00311∗∗∗
(0.00051) (0.00030) (0.00085) (0.00069)
year==2006 0.00084 0.00026 -0.00008 -0.00041
(0.00052) (0.00031) (0.00088) (0.00071)
Observations 295,515 295,952 297,697 297,697
R-squared 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.02
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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Table 15: Credit Demand and Growth of Short-term Borrowings, by Industry
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Short-term Borrowings Growth Rate
Industry Basic Material Processing Others
and Assembly
Inventory Growth Rate 0.17335∗∗∗ 0.16036∗∗∗ 0.23168∗∗∗
(0.01062) (0.01139) (0.01039)
Sales Growth -0.00720∗∗∗ -0.00194 -0.00402∗∗∗
(0.00138) (0.00121) (0.00133)
Current Asset Ratio 0.01101∗∗∗ 0.01131∗∗∗ 0.01116∗∗∗
(0.00185) (0.00225) (0.00168)
Cash–C. Liability Ratio 0.00450∗∗∗ 0.00460∗∗∗ 0.00451∗∗∗
(0.00024) (0.00028) (0.00023)
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.00254∗∗∗ 0.00276∗∗∗ 0.00319∗∗∗
(0.00026) (0.00035) (0.00029)
Interest Rate -0.00264∗∗∗ -0.00270∗∗∗ -0.00247∗∗∗
(0.00029) (0.00036) (0.00028)
Annual Change -0.01458∗∗∗ -0.01694∗∗∗ -0.01610∗∗∗
in Interest Rate (0.00045) (0.00052) (0.00047)
ROA -0.05312∗∗∗ -0.04023∗∗∗ -0.04940∗∗∗
(0.00505) (0.00527) (0.00487)
Leverage -0.00076 -0.00102 0.00225∗∗
(0.00119) (0.00143) (0.00109)
ln(1+sales) 0.00067∗∗∗ 0.00032 0.00056∗∗
(0.00021) (0.00027) (0.00022)
year==2004 -0.00206∗∗ -0.00289∗∗∗ -0.00507∗∗∗
(0.00084) (0.00106) (0.00084)
year==2005 -0.00080 -0.00372∗∗∗ -0.00093
(0.00083) (0.00105) (0.00084)
year==2006 0.00205∗∗ 0.00207∗ -0.00148∗
(0.00086) (0.00107) (0.00085)
Observations 99,582 74,574 107,383
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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Table 16: Credit Demand and Growth of Trade Payables, by Industry
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
Industry Basic Material Processing Others
and Assembly
Inventory Growth Rate 0.28704∗∗∗ 0.33470∗∗∗ 0.19426∗∗∗
(0.00816) (0.00934) (0.00677)
Sales Growth 0.05765∗∗∗ 0.04922∗∗∗ 0.04253∗∗∗
(0.00133) (0.00120) (0.00162)
Current Asset Ratio -0.00280∗∗ -0.00575∗∗∗ -0.00614∗∗∗
(0.00121) (0.00155) (0.00095)
Cash–C. Liability Ratio 0.00114∗∗∗ 0.00142∗∗∗ 0.00145∗∗∗
(0.00012) (0.00016) (0.00011)
Tangible Asset Ratio -0.00085∗∗∗ -0.00118∗∗∗ -0.00063∗∗∗
(0.00020) (0.00027) (0.00019)
Interest Rate -0.00048∗ -0.00002 0.00091∗∗∗
(0.00028) (0.00034) (0.00026)
Annual Change -0.01161∗∗∗ -0.01314∗∗∗ -0.00773∗∗∗
in Interest Rate (0.00252) (0.00287) (0.00233)
ROA -0.01161∗∗∗ -0.01314∗∗∗ -0.00773∗∗∗
(0.00252) (0.00287) (0.00233)
Leverage 0.00056 0.00232∗∗∗ 0.00156∗∗∗
(0.00056) (0.00070) (0.00046)
ln(1+sales) 0.00087∗∗∗ 0.00198∗∗∗ -0.00043∗∗∗
(0.00012) (0.00017) (0.00011)
year==2004 0.00341∗∗∗ 0.00407∗∗∗ 0.00199∗∗∗
(0.00051) (0.00069) (0.00046)
year==2005 -0.00015 -0.00336∗∗∗ -0.00010
(0.00052) (0.00070) (0.00045)
year==2006 -0.00012 -0.00070 0.00136∗∗∗
(0.00053) (0.00070) (0.00046)
Observations 99,747 74,389 107,674
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.09
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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Table 17: Credit Demand and Annual Change in ST Borrowings–Current Liabilities
(Compared by Industries)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Annual Change in ST Borrowings–C. Liability
Industry Basic Material Processing Others
and Assembly
Inventory Growth Rate -0.00855 -0.03961∗∗ 0.07970∗∗∗
(0.01589) (0.01662) (0.01500)
Sales Growth -0.05408∗∗∗ -0.04677∗∗∗ -0.04083∗∗∗
(0.00198) (0.00199) (0.00235)
Current Asset Ratio 0.03882∗∗∗ 0.05333∗∗∗ 0.03038∗∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00357) (0.00268)
Cash–Short-term Loan Ratio 0.01106∗∗∗ 0.01347∗∗∗ 0.01158∗∗∗
(0.00069) (0.00079) (0.00069)
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.00636∗∗∗ 0.00827∗∗∗ 0.00701∗∗∗
(0.00053) (0.00071) (0.00059)
Interest Rate -0.02024∗∗∗ -0.02355∗∗∗ -0.02149∗∗∗
(0.00075) (0.00084) (0.00075)
Annual Change -0.00159 0.00038 -0.01086∗
in Interest Rate (0.00676) (0.00713) (0.00622)
ROA -0.00159 0.00038 -0.01086∗
(0.00676) (0.00713) (0.00622)
Leverage 0.00635∗∗∗ 0.00907∗∗∗ 0.00504∗∗∗
(0.00145) (0.00167) (0.00119)
ln(1+sales) 0.00200∗∗∗ 0.00147∗∗∗ 0.00274∗∗∗
(0.00036) (0.00044) (0.00036)
year==2004 -0.00613∗∗∗ -0.00744∗∗∗ -0.00757∗∗∗
(0.00139) (0.00174) (0.00137)
year==2005 -0.00391∗∗∗ -0.00563∗∗∗ -0.00407∗∗∗
(0.00142) (0.00174) (0.00138)
year==2006 -0.00023 0.00335∗ -0.00360∗∗
(0.00146) (0.00181) (0.00142)
Observations 100,233 75,058 108,143
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.01
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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Table 18: Credit Demand and Annual Change in Trade Payables–Current Liabilities
(Compared by Industries)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Annual Change in Trade Payables–C. Liability
Industry Basic Material Processing Others
and Assembly
Inventory Growth Rate 0.18040∗∗∗ 0.18560∗∗∗ 0.13684∗∗∗
(0.01469) (0.01613) (0.01338)
Sales Growth Rate 0.03405∗∗∗ 0.02754∗∗∗ 0.02679∗∗∗
(0.00181) (0.00168) (0.00199)
Current Asset Ratio -0.02945∗∗∗ -0.03799∗∗∗ -0.02181∗∗∗
(0.00252) (0.00300) (0.00219)
Cash–Short-term Loan Ratio -0.00569∗∗∗ -0.00519∗∗∗ -0.00566∗∗∗
(0.00063) (0.00072) (0.00065)
Tangible Asset Ratio -0.00158∗∗∗ -0.00309∗∗∗ -0.00194∗∗∗
(0.00047) (0.00062) (0.00052)
Interest Rate 0.00505∗∗∗ 0.00559∗∗∗ 0.00660∗∗∗
(0.00061) (0.00067) (0.00057)
Annual Change 0.00645 0.00297 0.01678∗∗∗
in Interest Rate (0.00518) (0.00546) (0.00476)
ROA 0.00645 0.00297 0.01678∗∗∗
(0.00518) (0.00546) (0.00476)
Leverage -0.00101 -0.00091 -0.00090
(0.00105) (0.00123) (0.00089)
ln(1+sales) -0.00018 0.00046 -0.00082∗∗∗
(0.00030) (0.00033) (0.00028)
year==2004 0.00733∗∗∗ 0.00461∗∗∗ 0.00593∗∗∗
(0.00116) (0.00142) (0.00109)
year==2005 -0.00129 -0.00584∗∗∗ -0.00231∗∗
(0.00118) (0.00144) (0.00110)
year==2006 -0.00020 -0.00488∗∗∗ 0.00307∗∗∗
(0.00119) (0.00148) (0.00114)
Observations 100,233 75,058 108,143
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.01
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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Table 19: Credit Demand and Growth of Short-term Borrowings
(Compared by the Amount of Collateral Assets)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Short-term Borrowings Growth Rate
Collateral Low Middle High
Inventory Growth Rate 0.18461∗∗∗ 0.20221∗∗∗ 0.17464∗∗∗
(0.00945) (0.01027) (0.01134)
Sales Growth Rate -0.00594∗∗∗ -0.00247∗ -0.00397∗∗∗
(0.00112) (0.00128) (0.00122)
Current Asset Ratio 0.02580∗∗∗ 0.03925∗∗∗ 0.02620∗∗∗
(0.00236) (0.00243) (0.00188)
Cash–Short-term Loan Ratio 0.00789∗∗∗ 0.00724∗∗∗ 0.00324∗∗∗
(0.00030) (0.00029) (0.00020)
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.01795∗∗∗ 0.02961∗∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗
(0.00372) (0.00269) (0.00017)
Interest Rate -0.00257∗∗∗ -0.00282∗∗∗ -0.00250∗∗∗
(0.00036) (0.00031) (0.00023)
Annual Change -0.01947∗∗∗ -0.01619∗∗∗ -0.01195∗∗∗
in Interest Rate (0.00056) (0.00052) (0.00034)
ROA -0.06825∗∗∗ -0.04075∗∗∗ -0.01607∗∗∗
(0.00451) (0.00484) (0.00426)
Leverage 0.00343∗∗∗ 0.00908∗∗∗ 0.00895∗∗∗
(0.00091) (0.00147) (0.00122)
ln(1+sales) 0.00064∗∗ -0.00021 -0.00012
(0.00032) (0.00022) (0.00018)
year==2004 -0.00431∗∗∗ -0.00471∗∗∗ -0.00226∗∗∗
(0.00113) (0.00083) (0.00066)
year==2005 -0.00179 -0.00294∗∗∗ -0.00045
(0.00111) (0.00083) (0.00066)
year==2006 0.00168 -0.00046 0.00085
(0.00115) (0.00085) (0.00068)
Observations 94,002 99,234 102,279
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.03
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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Table 20: Credit Demand and Growth of Trade Payables
(Compared by the Amount of Collateral Assets)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
Collateral Low Middle High
Inventory Growth Rate 0.22415∗∗∗ 0.27214∗∗∗ 0.35728∗∗∗
(0.00668) (0.00772) (0.00977)
Sales Growth Rate 0.04505∗∗∗ 0.05251∗∗∗ 0.05645∗∗∗
(0.00101) (0.00193) (0.00152)
Current Asset Ratio -0.00655∗∗∗ -0.01324∗∗∗ -0.01650∗∗∗
(0.00126) (0.00165) (0.00155)
Cash–C. Liability Ratio 0.00148∗∗∗ 0.00037∗∗∗ 0.00031∗∗∗
(0.00015) (0.00012) (0.00010)
Tangible Asset Ratio -0.00495∗∗ -0.00632∗∗∗ -0.00059∗∗∗
(0.00226) (0.00164) (0.00014)
Interest Rate 0.00101∗∗∗ 0.00042∗∗ -0.00008
(0.00022) (0.00019) (0.00016)
Annual Change 0.00026 0.00044 -0.00025
in Interest Rate (0.00033) (0.00031) (0.00022)
ROA -0.01131∗∗∗ -0.00778∗∗∗ -0.01215∗∗∗
(0.00219) (0.00244) (0.00251)
Leverage 0.00150∗∗∗ -0.00182∗∗ -0.00701∗∗∗
(0.00042) (0.00078) (0.00077)
ln(1+sales) 0.00032∗ 0.00073∗∗∗ 0.00104∗∗∗
(0.00017) (0.00012) (0.00011)
year==2004 0.00293∗∗∗ 0.00323∗∗∗ 0.00272∗∗∗
(0.00064) (0.00048) (0.00043)
year==2005 -0.00149∗∗ -0.00103∗∗ -0.00023
(0.00065) (0.00048) (0.00044)
year==2006 -0.00004 0.00004 0.00074
(0.00067) (0.00049) (0.00045)
Observations 94,401 99,447 102,104
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.14
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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Table 21: Credit Demand and Growth of Short-term Borrowings
(Compared to Firm Leverage)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Short-term Borrowings Growth Rate
Leverage Low Middle High
Inventory Growth Rate 0.20338∗∗∗ 0.20036∗∗∗ 0.15590∗∗∗
(0.01043) (0.00950) (0.01139)
Sales Growth Rate 0.00407∗∗∗ 0.00243∗∗ -0.01471∗∗∗
(0.00130) (0.00117) (0.00125)
Current Asset Ratio 0.01865∗∗∗ 0.01948∗∗∗ 0.00846∗∗∗
(0.00169) (0.00188) (0.00211)
Cash–Short-term Loan Ratio 0.00404∗∗∗ 0.00698∗∗∗ 0.00641∗∗∗
(0.00019) (0.00032) (0.00033)
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.00241∗∗∗ 0.00887∗∗∗ 0.00815∗∗∗
(0.00019) (0.00069) (0.00072)
Interest Rate -0.00287∗∗∗ -0.00310∗∗∗ -0.00185∗∗∗
(0.00027) (0.00032) (0.00033)
Annual Change -0.01488∗∗∗ -0.01589∗∗∗ -0.01592∗∗∗
in Interest Rate (0.00037) (0.00049) (0.00056)
ROA -0.00428 -0.02070∗∗∗ -0.07969∗∗∗
(0.00414) (0.00599) (0.00418)
Leverage 0.01285∗∗∗ 0.01686∗∗∗ 0.00208∗∗
(0.00182) (0.00577) (0.00097)
ln(1+sales) 0.00009 -0.00009 0.00053
(0.00020) (0.00021) (0.00032)
year==2004 -0.00197∗∗∗ -0.00426∗∗∗ -0.00511∗∗∗
(0.00071) (0.00081) (0.00107)
year==2005 -0.00219∗∗∗ -0.00216∗∗∗ -0.00114
(0.00071) (0.00081) (0.00107)
year==2006 -0.00039 -0.00041 0.00247∗∗
(0.00072) (0.00084) (0.00111)
Observations 99,827 98,840 96,848
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.03
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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Table 22: Credit Demand and Growth of Trade Payables
(Compared by a Firm’s Leverage)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
Leverage Low Middle High
Inventory Growth Rate 0.29806∗∗∗ 0.26664∗∗∗ 0.23789∗∗∗
(0.00800) (0.00753) (0.00787)
Sales Growth Rate 0.04826∗∗∗ 0.05800∗∗∗ 0.04453∗∗∗
(0.00121) (0.00202) (0.00108)
Current Asset Ratio -0.00254∗∗ -0.01291∗∗∗ -0.00592∗∗∗
(0.00111) (0.00137) (0.00120)
Cash–C. Liability Ratio 0.00061∗∗∗ 0.00114∗∗∗ 0.00135∗∗∗
(0.00009) (0.00016) (0.00016)
Tangible Asset Ratio -0.00100∗∗∗ -0.00319∗∗∗ -0.00397∗∗∗
(0.00016) (0.00055) (0.00047)
Interest Rate 0.00040∗∗ 0.00058∗∗∗ 0.00053∗∗∗
(0.00017) (0.00021) (0.00020)
Annual Change -0.00052∗∗ 0.00014 0.00124∗∗∗
in Interest Rate (0.00022) (0.00031) (0.00033)
ROA -0.01268∗∗∗ -0.01437∗∗∗ -0.00919∗∗∗
(0.00234) (0.00331) (0.00200)
Leverage -0.00573∗∗∗ -0.00776∗∗ 0.00221∗∗∗
(0.00119) (0.00372) (0.00043)
ln(1+sales) 0.00058∗∗∗ 0.00061∗∗∗ 0.00099∗∗∗
(0.00010) (0.00013) (0.00018)
year==2004 0.00258∗∗∗ 0.00379∗∗∗ 0.00263∗∗∗
(0.00045) (0.00053) (0.00057)
year==2005 -0.00134∗∗∗ -0.00091∗ -0.00030
(0.00044) (0.00053) (0.00059)
year==2006 0.00010 0.00103∗ -0.00030
(0.00045) (0.00054) (0.00062)
Observations 94,401 99,447 102,104
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.14
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ represents signiﬁcance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level,
and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies recorded in the CRD
dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at the 0.5 percentile or the 99.5 percentile
of the sample. The results do not change if we truncate at the 1st percentile or the 99th percentile of the
sample.
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